Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte für Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C70, C72.
Introduction
replicator dynamics are the canonical dynamic model of evolutionary game theory. Their properties in finite games and connections with static equilibrium concepts are by now well understood Sigmund 1998, Weibull 1995) . Moreover, their importance as a special case of the more general payoff-monotonic and payoff-positive dynamics, and as an approximation of certain learning models (Börgers and Sarin 1997 , Schlag 1998 , Hopkins 2002 , Benaïm and Weibull 2003 , is well recognized. But their behavior in games with infinite strategy sets has only recently been investigated (Bomze 1990 , Seymour 2000 , Oechssler and Riedel 2001 , 2002 , Eshel and Sansone 2003 , Cressman 2005 , Cressman, Hofbauer, and Riedel 2005 , due to the attendant technical difficulties.
Chief amongst these is the task of providing a notion of "distance" between populations as compelling as the natural Euclidean distance of the familiar finite-dimensional setting.
The leading contenders for this title are the variational (or strong) topology and the weak topology on the (infinite-dimensional) vector space of signed measures on the strategy space. This contest is unlikely to produce a clear winner, since arguments in favor of both topologies can be offered (Oechssler and Riedel 2001, 2002) . In this paper, the variational topology is adopted, in part because of the wider class of payoff functions that it allows, as discussed in the next section.
This conceptual thicket is not without analytical fruit; evolutionarily stable strategies are no longer necessarily asymptotically stable in infinite strategy spaces, suggesting some ESS to be more stable than others as a finite strategy grid becomes arbitrarily fine. Under the variational topology, however, Bomze's (1990) "strong uninvadability" refinement does imply a weakened form of asymptotic stability, and indeed a homogeneous, "uninvadable" population delivers the undiluted version (Oechssler and Riedel 2001) . In this paper, a setwise generalization of strong uninvadability-"strong immutability"-is defined for faces of strategies and shown to give asymptotic stability under the replicator dynamics. The weaker notion of a "strongly immovable face" is also defined, and shown to imply Lyapunov stability. Finally, in case sets more general than faces are called upon, Bomze's result is shown to extend to "strongly uninvadable sets."
Interest in setwise stability concepts is firmly established in finite evolutionary settings (Thomas 1985d , Gilboa and Matsui 1991 , Swinkels 1992 , Ritzberger and Weibull 1995 , Balkenborg and Schlag 2001 , and in game theory more generally (Kalai and Samet 1984 , Kohlberg and Mertens 1986 , Basu and Weibull 1991 . Indeed, pointwise solution concepts have certain defects which setwise concepts need not share (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986, Dufwenberg, Norde, Reijnierse, and Tijs 2001) . The stability concepts developed in this paper are of particular use in models with equivalent outcomes, including certain public-project mechanisms, the evolution of preferences and mixed-strategy models. To illustrate their utility, several examples of applications are given at the end of the paper.
Dynamics
Consider a symmetric two-player game with arbitrary (Borel) strategy sets S ⊂ R n , and a bounded, Borel-measurable payoff function f : S × S → R. This game is played by random pairwise matchings amongst a population of players programmed to pure strategies. The play of the population as a whole is described by a probability measure P on the measure space (S, B) , where B denotes the Borel σ-algebra on S. The support of a population P , supp(P ), is the unique (relatively) closed subset of S such that the measure of its complement is 0 but every open set that intersects it has positive measure. 1 ∆ denotes the simplex of all populations P on (S, B); ∆ A the set of all populations P with supp(P ) ⊆ A, A ∈ B-i.e. the face of a particular Borel set A. For given A ∈ B, A c := S\A is the complement of A. The distribution of the players' strategies evolves in continuous time according to Taylor and Jonker's (1978) replicator dynamics, adapted for the infinite strategy space (Bomze 1990, Oechssler and Riedel 2001) . In particular, the analysis takes place on the Banach space M e (S, B) of signed measures endowed with the supremum or variational norm,
where the sup is taken over all measurable functions f : S → R bounded by 1, sup s∈S |f (s)| ≤ 1.
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For the present purposes, the variational norm's specialization to probability measures,
(see Shiryaev 1995, p. 360 ) is particularly useful.
The average payoff of population P against population Q is
E(P, Q) = S S
f (x, y)Q(dy)P (dx).
The replicator dynamics then, as usual, increase the frequency of strategies that are successful relative to the prevailing average fitness:
Q (t)(A) =

A σ(x, Q(t))Q(t)(dx), Q(0)
for all A ∈ B, where
is the success of strategy x if the population is Q, δ x denoting a Dirac measure with mass 1 on x. Note that the usual finite-strategy-set replicator dynamics constitute a special case of this framework. The use of the variational norm revolves around the question of what is meant by the "distance" between populations in the infinite-strategy-space setting. The variational norm captures the most common evolutionary sense of distance, in that a mutated population (1 − η)P + ηQ is close to the population P in the variational topology for small η (Oechssler and Riedel 2001) . However, the variational norm is also quite a strong measure of distance, so that, for example, two distinct homogeneous populations δ x and δ y , x = y, always have maximal distance from one another in the variational topology, no matter how close are their strategies x and y in the natural metric on S (Oechssler and Riedel 2002) . This problem can be resolved by adopting the topology of weak convergence, but at the cost of quite stringent requirements for stability, and a narrower class of payoff functions giving well-defined dynamics.
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In particular, the variational topology has the advantage of not requiring continuity of f , which is particularly pertinent for the setwise stability concepts considered here, since they will frequently arise in cases with discontinuous payoff functions. Moreover, in these cases, players will have more or less blunt incentives not to drift over the payoff discontinuity points in the manner critiqued by the weak-topology approach. It can also be argued that δ x and δ y , x = y, should not be considered "close" to one another in any case, irrespective of the distance between x and y, since transition from one to the other requires a high degree of coordinated mutation amongst the members of the population. Why should it be any easier for the whole population simultaneously to mutate to one strategy rather than another?
With these arguments in mind, the variational topology is adopted here, and it will play an important role in the analysis. Oechssler and Riedel (2001) prove that, in this setting, the replicator dynamics are well defined if the payoff function f is bounded-an assumption that is maintained here.
Stability
It is well known that symmetric Nash equilibria are stationary under the replicator dynamics. And whilst there are stationary states of the replicator dynamics that are not symmetric Nash equilibria, no such state satisfies even the weak requirement of Lyapunov stability.
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The set of symmetric Nash equilibria in a game can of course be refined using Lyapunov and asymptotic stability, but these criteria can be somewhat cumbersome to check in individual applications.
With finite strategy sets, the static criteria of evolutionary and neutral stability (Maynard Smith 1974 are helpful in this regard. In the notation of Section 2, a population P is an evolutionarily stable state (ESS) if, for every "mutation" Q, there is an invasion barrier
If the inequality in (4) is weak, then ε(Q) is called a neutrality barrier and P is a neutrally stable state (NSS). In the finite case with pairwise interactions, every ESS is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker 1978, Hofbauer, Schuster, and Sigmund 1979) , and every NSS is Lyapunov stable (Thomas 1985d, Bomze and Weibull 1995) .
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However, in infinite strategy spaces, Oechssler and Riedel (2001) show that the former result no longer holds, so that a stronger concept than ESS is necessary. Vickers and Cannings (1987) call a population uninvadable if it has a uniform invasion barrier-that is, an ε > 0 such that (4) holds for all Q and all 0 < η ≤ ε. The corresponding case with a uniform neutrality barrier is termed an unbeatable population by Bomze and Weibull (1995) . Clearly uninvadability implies evolutionary stability whilst unbeatability implies neutral stability. If we allow mutations amongst the whole population to populations that are "nearby" in the variational topology, even stronger stability concepts are required. Bomze (1990) calls a population P strongly uninvadable if there is a barrier ε > 0 such that for all populations R = P with R − P ≤ ε, we have
If the inequality in (5) is weak, then P is called strongly unbeatable (Bomze and Weibull 1995) . Strong uninvadability implies uninvadability, and if the equilibrium population state is homogeneous, then the criteria coincide. Oechssler and Riedel's (2001) Theorem 3 shows that, in infinite strategy spaces, every uninvadable, homogeneous population is Lyapunov stable, and-if f is continuous-"weakly attracting" (see Definition 2 below). But of course, such a population may not exist; and in many such cases, a setwise stability concept will be useful. Bernhard Thomas was the first to extend evolutionary stability to sets of strategies. A set of populations Π ⊆ ∆ is called an evolutionarily stable (ES) set (Thomas 1985d) if it is nonempty and closed, and each P ∈ Π has some neighborhood U such that E(P, R) ≥ E(R, R) for all R ∈ U , with strict inequality if R / ∈ Π.
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As Balkenborg and Schlag (2001) point out, this setwise stability criterion in fact extends the notion of uninvadability-rather than 5 For a review of results in finite strategy spaces, see Weibull (1995) . For the complications arising outside the case of pairwise interactions-and the resulting implications of different notions of evolutionary stabilitysee Bomze and Weibull (1995) .
6 See also Bomze (1998) , as well as Thomas (1985b,c) and Cressman, Garay, and Varga (2003) for applications to population genetics. Alternative setwise stability criteria include Swinkels' (1992) "equilibrium evolutionarily stable sets" and Gilboa and Matsui's (1991) "cyclically stable sets." evolutionary stability-to sets of populations. They also argue that a more appropriate setwise extension of uninvadability has the specified properties hold for some ε-neighborhood of any P ∈ Π, where the barrier ε > 0 is independent of the particular population P (as well as R).
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Clearly a population that belongs to such a set is neutrally stable, but the set as a whole has the properties of uninvadability with respect to populations not in the set. Correspondingly, if ε-closeness is defined on the variational topology, we require the following concept.
Definition 1 A set of populations Π ⊆ ∆ is a strongly uninvadable set if and only if it is nonempty and there is a barrier ε > 0 such that each P ∈ Π has E(P, R) ≥ E(R, R) for all R with R − P ≤ ε, with strict inequality if R / ∈ Π. If the inequality remains weak for R / ∈ Π, then Π is a strongly unbeatable set.
The following result-proved in the Appendix-unsurprisingly holds for elements of such sets.
Proposition 1 If P belongs to a strongly unbeatable set Π ⊆ ∆, then P is a Nash equilibrium.
To investigate the dynamic stability properties of such sets, it is first necessary to extend the standard concepts (e.g. Oechssler and Riedel's (2001) Definition 6) to a setwise framework. Given a set of populations
Definition 2 Let Π * ⊆ ∆ be a closed set of populations. Then:
weakly (i.e. the Prohorov distance between Q(t) and Π * vanishes).
The latter concept is one possible formulation of asymptotic stability for an infinite strategy space. In finite strategy spaces, every ES set is asymptotically stable (Weibull 1995) . Since an ES set has the properties of uninvadability, one might conjecture that a similar result would hold for strongly uninvadable sets in the infinite case. This is shown to be true for faces ∆ A , A ∈ B. The restriction to faces is necessary for the same reason as Oechssler and Riedel's (2001) requirement of homogeneity for single populations; namely, so that the measure on A can be considered without regard to its distribution. For more general sets, we will demonstrate a slightly weaker form of stability.
Given A ∈ B, and a population R with R(A) ∈ (0, 1), let R A be the probability measure
Consider the following weakening of strong uninvadability for faces.
Definition 3 ∆ A is a strongly immutable face if and only if it is nonempty and there is a barrier
Note that the usual weak inequality proviso for R ∈ ∆ A is superfluous here, since Remark The importance of strong immutability-rather than strong uninvadabilityderives from the possibility of mutation amongst the whole population within the bounds prescribed by the variational topology. This is unimportant in the singleton case A = {x}, where a mutated population R has R A ≡ δ x ; when dealing with nonsingleton sets, by contrast, a mutation away from a given population P ∈ ∆ A can give R A = P . So whilst a strongly uninvadable face is certainly Lyapunov stable and (for continuous f ) weakly attracting, strong immutability provides a weaker sufficient condition.
An alternative characterization of a strongly immutable face is available, in terms of the following two constituents.
Definition 4 A strictly fitter mutation away from ∆ A is a population R, with R(A) ∈ (0, 1),
Roughly speaking, a strictly fitter mutation away from ∆ A is a population whose strategies outside of A do better against its strategies in A than they themselves do. A secret-handshake mutation away from ∆ A is a population R whose strategies outside of A: (a) do equally well against R's strategies in A as do the latter; and (b) do at least as well against themselves as R's strategies in A do against them. Secret handshakes (Robson 1990 ) are a familiar evolutionary phenomenon; the secret-handshake mutations defined here are somewhat different, but transpose the essence of the concept to the present setting. This result parallels the equivalence between Thomas' (1985d) notion of evolutionary stability for single populations and the concept of uninvadability (Bomze and Weibull 1995) , and is often useful for applications. Note that, whilst not all elements of a strongly immutable face need be Nash, the absence of strictly fitter mutations does accord the set as a whole a Nash-like property. This feature is shared by faces that are "closed under better replies" (Ritzberger and Weibull 1995) , all of which are strongly immutable (by Proposition 3) and many of which contain non-Nash elements.
In cases where a strongly immutable face fails to exist, the following natural weakening of the concept may be useful. The proofs of these results are obvious variants on their counterparts for strong immutability. A useful equivalent characterization of strong immovability is again available. Define a firmhandshake mutation away from ∆ A to be a population R, with R(A) ∈ (0, 1), for which
Definition 5 ∆ A is a strongly immovable face if and only if it is nonempty and there is a barrier
Proposition 5 There are neither any strictly fitter mutations nor firm-handshake mutations away from a nonempty ∆ A if and only if it is strongly immovable.
This result parallels the equivalence between Thomas' (1985d) notion of weak evolutionary stability for single populations and the concept of unbeatability (Bomze and Weibull 1995) .
Stable sets in evolutionary models are often not faces though, and hence it is desirable to consider the stability of more general sets. Here we can demonstrate a weaker form of stability for strongly uninvadable sets by exploiting Bomze's (1990 Bomze's ( , 1991 decreasing "cross entropy" results. Given a population P absolutely continuous with respect to another population Q, P Q, the cross entropy or Kullback-Leibler (1951) distance of Q with respect to P is
where dP/dQ is a Radon-Nikodym derivative of P with respect to Q. K Q:P is nonnegative and vanishes if and only if Q = P ; moreover, Q − P 2 ≤ K Q:P by Bomze's (1991) Lemma 3. The set U Π = {Q ∈ ∆ : (∃P ∈ Π : P Q and K Q:P < δ)} can thus be considered a "vicinity" of Π in some sense, though not strictly speaking a "neighborhood;" K Q:P is asymmetric in Q and P , and the sets U P , δ > 0, do not define a topology (Bomze 1991) . It also clearly captures a stronger notion of "closeness" than does the variational topology. Using this apparatus, we have the following extension of Bomze's (1990) Theorem 2.
The useful properties of the Kullback-Leibler distance compensate here for the reduced structure on the sets.
Applications
Equivalent outcomes The setwise stability concepts explored above will most obviously arise in games with sets of payoff-equivalent outcomes. The simplest setting in which such equivalent outcomes will exist is that where the payoff function is independent of the opponent's action, f (x, y) = g(x), and has a set A of maximizers. In this case, To see this note that, for any population R with R ([0.5, 1] ) ∈ (0, 1), 
Hence, there are neither any strictly fitter nor secret-handshake mutations away from ∆ [0.5,1] , which is thus strongly immutable by Proposition 3 and Lyapunov stable by Theorem 1. Suppose now that the public-good provider only observes a noisy signals i = s i +E i of each player's reported payoff, with E i a continuous random variable on (−ψ, ψ), ψ ∈ (0, 0.5). In this case, with the good provided iffs row +s column ≥ 1, the good is provided with probability 1 iff s row + s column ≥ 1 + 2ψ. Also, since each E i is continuous, the payoff function f is now continuous, so that the second condition of Theorem 1 is met. Hence, ∆ [0.5+ψ,1] is both Lyapunov stable and weakly attracting.
Consider now the same game (without noise), but where, in the case s row + s column < 1, a reported payoff exceeding 0.75 by one of the players leads the public-good provider still to provide the good, but then to levy the whole cost c > v on that player. This reduces Preference evolution Sets of equivalent outcomes could of course arise in many other games, and in particular are quite natural (indeed, seemingly unavoidable) in models of preference evolution (see, e.g., Samuelson 2001 , Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya 2007 , Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel 2007 . In such models, players play rationally for given preferences, but those preferences are free and subject to evolutionary selection according to their success in an underlying game of biological fitness. Suppose, for instance, that a population of players is repeatedly matched to play the pure coordination game in Figure 3(a) , where the numbers represent fitnesses. Each player i ∈ {r, c} then also has an additive bias x i ∈ (−5, 5) in favor of one strategy or the other, so that the payoffs to each possible outcome are as depicted in Figure 3 (b) . Suppose that this game is common knowledge, so that in particular both fitnesses and biases are observable by the players. However, the players choose their strategies in order to maximize payoffs, not fitnesses, and thus play a Nash equilibrium of the payoff game in Figure 3(b) ; if there is more than one such equilibrium, each of the possible equilibria is assumed to be played with strictly positive probability. The preference biases {x r , x c } are then shaped by the replicator dynamics (2) with S = (−5, 5) and f (x, y) determined by the fitnesses in Figure 3(a) .
The "game" on which the replicator dynamics act in this case is depicted in Figure 4 , the Nash equilibria occupying the shaded regions where coordination is enforced by a dominant strategy for at least one of the players. The face ∆ (1, 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Figure 4: Stable biases
sustaining coordination on the Pareto-dominant (fitness) equilibrium {U, L} through dominant strategies for both players. Clearly there can be no strictly fitter mutations away from this face, whilst E(R (1, 5) , R (1,5) ) = E(R (−5,1] , R (1, 5) ) implies that
for any R with R((1, 5)) ∈ (0, 1), precluding secret-handshake mutations as well. Therefore, ∆ (1,5) is strongly immutable by Proposition 3 and Lyapunov stable by Theorem 1. Furthermore, if the probabilities assigned to multiple equilibria in the payoff game vary continuously with x r and x c , then f is continuous, and ∆ [1, 5) becomes weakly attracting. By contrast, the face ∆ (−5,−2) of symmetric equilibria supporting coordination on the Pareto-dominated equilibrium {D, R} is vulnerable to secret-handshake mutations R with support divided between (−5, −2) and [−2, 1), for which
that stability implies efficiency under observable preferences (Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya 2006) .
Mixed strategies Typically, players are restricted to pure strategies in the replicator dynamics, and mixed strategies are viewed as descriptions of play at the population level. But an alternative approach is to allow individual players to adopt mixed strategies, which can then be replicated just as readily as pure strategies (Zeeman 1981 , Hines 1982 , Akin 1982 , Thomas 1985a , Bomze 1990 , Cressman 1990 , 1992b , Weissing 1991 . This has the advantage of delivering the converse implication between evolutionary and asymptotic stability, but the model sits uneasily at best with the usual finite setting. By contrast, as Oechssler and Riedel (2001) point out, this approach fits quite straightforwardly into the present framework. If T is a finite set of pure strategies, of cardinality n, then let Σ(T ) :
the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex-be the infinite strategy set S from which our population of players can choose. With a payoff matrix U : T × T → R, we have
and hence
where µ(P ) := Σ(T ) xP (dx) is the mean mixed strategy in population P .
Consider in particular the symmetric 3 × 3 game with payoff matrix
The symmetric Nash equilibria of this game employ the strategies {x ∈ Σ(T ) : x 1 = x 2 }, as illustrated in Figure 5 . These equilibrium outcomes are not payoff-equivalent, but for any symmetric equilibrium x and any y ∈ Σ(T ), f (x, y) − f (y, y) = (y 1 − y 2 ) 2 , so that f (x, y) ≥ f (y, y) for all y ∈ Σ(T ), with equality only for symmetric equilibrium y. This example appears in the usual (finite) pure-strategy setting in Weibull (1995) (and also in Cressman 1992b ). There, the set of all populations with equal numbers playing the pure strategies s 1 and s 2 is an evolutionarily stable set. Once players are allowed to play mixed strategies, however, this set is strongly unbeatable but not strongly uninvadable; moreover, it is not a face, so that Theorems 1 and 2 will not apply. Nonetheless, it can be shown using (6)
if µ 1 (P ) = µ 2 (P ), so that firm-handshake mutations away from the face ∆ {x∈Σ(T ): 1) ). Since strictly fitter mutations are also clearly impossible (µ(P ) being a symmetric equilibrium for all P ∈ ∆ {x∈Σ(T ):x 1 =x 2 } ), ∆ {x∈Σ(T ):x 1 =x 2 } is strongly immovable by Proposition 5 and hence Lyapunov stable by Theorem 2.
More generally, given that a mixture of mixed strategies yields just another mixed strategy, there will clearly be sets of populations that are behaviorally equivalent in evolutionary mixed-strategy games with random pairwise matching. The dynamic process will find such sets indistinguishable, so that setwise stability concepts become key. Faces, however, are inadequate to capture the behavioral equivalencies associated with mixed-strategy models; since the population mean mixed strategy determines population payoffs and thus stability, we will be interested in sets of populations sharing the same mean, which will not in general be faces. This is clear even from the 3 × 3 example above; ∆ {x∈Σ(T ):x 1 =x 2 } is strongly immovable but not strongly immutable (and not weakly attracting), since any R / ∈ ∆ {x∈Σ(T ):x 1 =x 2 } with R({x ∈ Σ(T ) : x 1 = x 2 }) ∈ (0, 1) and µ 1 (R) = µ 2 (R) serves as a secret-handshake mutation. This is where Theorem 3 becomes useful, since the set {P ∈ ∆ : µ 1 (P ) = µ 2 (P )} is strongly
, and hence satisfies Theorem 3's weakening of asymptotic stability. Moreover, Theorem 3 should have power quite generally in such mixed-strategy models.
Conclusion
The concept of an evolutionarily stable set is useful when a game with a finite strategy space has a set of strategies that are not ESS's individually, but which behave like ESS's with respect to strategies outside the set. In games with infinite strategy spaces, however, the ES setlike other notions of evolutionary stability-requires reformulation in order to reproduce the dynamic stability properties of the finite-space concept. In this paper, we have introduced the appropriate extensions of ES sets to the infinite setting with the variational topology, and proved their stability under the replicator dynamics. The new concepts are of most obvious use in games with equivalent outcomes, of which there are many in economics. Evolutionary mixed-strategy models, for example, are but one member of the class of "population games," where a summary statistic determines the payoff of a population (Bomze 1991) , and for which sets of strategies yielding the same value of the summary statistic will be of interest.
Equivalencies-and thus setwise stability concepts-also arise naturally in extensive-form games (Cressman 1992a) , through unreached information sets. Infinitely repeated games constitute a particularly natural application, given their infinite strategy spaces and sets of equivalent Nash equilibria. In particular, consider the Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma where both players defect in every subgame. This equilibrium belongs to a large set of payoff-equivalent Nash equilibria with the same perpetual defection along the equilibrium path but different behavior off it. The evolutionary process studied here will find these Nash equilibria indistinguishable, suggesting the application of setwise stability criteria. Of course, such an approach would ignore the extensive-form structure of the game, and one can say a good deal more by taking this seriously (see, e.g., Cressman 2003) . But as in the case of mixed-strategy models, setwise stability concepts can address the problem of "spurious" duplication of strategies that dogs pointwise stability concepts in the standard normal-form analysis. 
Q (t)(A) =
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S S f (x, y)Q(t)(dy)Q A (t)(dx) − Q(t)(A)E(Q(t), Q(t)) = Q(t)(A) (E(Q A (t), Q(t)) − E(Q(t), Q(t))) , which is strictly positive if d(Q(t), ∆
[E(P, Q(t)) − E(Q(t), Q(t))] = E(P, R) − E(R, R),
for any P ∈ ∆ A such that P Q(0). Since we have already established that ∆ A is Lyapunov stable, R must be within ε of ∆ A , and hence of R A . And given that R A ∈ ∆ A is absolutely continuous with respect to R, and hence with respect to Q(0), E(R A , R) = E(R, R) and R ∈ ∆ A by strong immutability of ∆ A . 
This is strictly positive if and only if
R(A)(E(R
"⇒": In the absence of strictly fitter mutations, E(R A − R A c , R A ) ≥ 0. If this inequality holds strictly, then (7) must hold for ε sufficiently small, since R(A) → 1 as ε → 0. Moreover, in the absence of secret-handshake mutations, E(R A − R A c , R A ) = 0 implies E(R A c − R A , R A c ) < 0, so that (7) must again hold. ∆ A is thus a strongly immutable face.
"⇐": Suppose otherwise. Then ∆ A is strongly immutable and there exists either a strictly fitter mutation or a secret-handshake mutation away from ∆ A . By strong immutability of ∆ A , (7) must hold for all R with d(R, ∆ A ) ∈ (0, ε]. But if R = R(A)R A + R(A c )R A c is a strictly fitter mutation, then so is (1 − η)R A + ηR A c for all 0 < η < 1; and since E(R A − R A c , R A ) < 0, it follows that (7) is violated for η sufficiently small, a contradiction. Similarly, if R is a secret-handshake mutation, then so is (1 − η)R A + ηR A c for all 0 < η < 1; and since E(R A − R A c , R A ) = 0 and E(R A c − R A , R A c ) ≥ 0, (7) is again violated, giving a contradiction for η sufficiently small. Thus, neither a strictly fitter nor a secret-handshake mutation away from a strongly immutable ∆ A can exist. 
E(P, Q(s)) − E(Q(s), Q(s)) ds,
where the second line exploits Fubini's theorem. Given uniform continuity of the map t → σ(x, Q(t)) (established in the proof of Oechssler and Riedel's (2001) Theorem 3), which in turn yields continuity
of t → E(P, Q(t)) − E(Q(t), Q(t)), the time derivative of K Q(t):P at time t exists and equals E(Q(t), Q(t)) − E(P, Q(t)). This is nonpositive for Q(t) − P ≤ ε
by strong uninvadability of Π * , so that 0 ≤ K Q(t):P ≤ K Q(0):P < δ and Q(t) − P < ε for all t ≥ 0.
Therefore, the integrand on the right-hand side of (8) is nonnegative (and uniformly continuous in s ≥ 0), and since (8) is bounded below by 0, it follows that
E(P, Q(t)) − E(Q(t), Q(t)) → 0 as t → ∞.
Letting R be a weak accumulation point of the trajectory (Q(t)) t≥0 , we know from above that Q(t) − P < ε for all t ≥ 0, which implies that R − P ≤ ε. Therefore, R ∈ Π * by strong uninvadability of Π * .
